

Lionel Stefan Shapiro

Philosophy Department
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06269-1054

Tel.: (860) 486-9470
email: lionel.shapiro@uconn.edu
<http://shapiro.philosophy.uconn.edu>

Education

Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2004
A.B. in Mathematics, Harvard College, 1990

Appointments and Fellowships

University of Connecticut

Professor of Philosophy, 2020 – present
Associate Professor of Philosophy, 2011 – 2020
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, 2005 – 2011

University of Potsdam

Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Research Fellow, Spring 2017 and Spring 2018

University of Sydney

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Philosophy, January 2009 to August 2010

University of California, Berkeley

Visiting Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Spring 2005

Research Interests

Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Logic and Philosophical Logic, History of Modern Philosophy, History of Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind

Articles

“Truth’s Dialectical Role: From Friction to Tension,” forthcoming in *Inquiry* (online 2021)

“Global Expressivism as Global Subjectivism,” forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies* (online 2021)

“Price’s Subject Naturalism and Liberal Naturalism,” forthcoming in M. De Caro and D. Macarthur (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Liberal Naturalism*.

“Commitment Accounts of Assertion,” in S. Goldberg (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Assertion* (Oxford UP, 2020).

“Can Truth-Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’-Clause Ascriptions?” *Analytic Philosophy* 61 (2020): 1–27.

“Sellars, Truth Pluralism, and Truth Relativism,” in S. Brandt and A. Breunig (eds.), *Wilfrid Sellars and Twentieth-Century Philosophy* (Routledge, 2020).

- “Logical Expressivism and Logical Relations,” O. Beran, V. Kolman and L. Koreň (eds.), *From Rules to Meanings: New Essays on Inferentialism* (Routledge, 2018).
- “Curry’s Paradox” (with Jc Beall), new article in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2017).
- “LP, K3 and FDE as Substructural Logics,” in P. Arazim and T. Lavička (eds.), *Logica Yearbook 2016* (College Publications, 2017).
- “The Very Idea of A Substructural Approach to Paradox,” forthcoming in *Synthese* (online 2016).
- “Naive Structure, Contraction and Paradox,” *Topoi* 34 (2015): 75-87.
- “Validity and Truth-Preservation” (with Julien Murzi), in T. Achourioti, K. Fujimoto, H. Galinon and J. Martínez-Fernández (eds.), *Unifying the Philosophy of Truth* (Springer, 2015).
- “Assertoric Force Perspectivalism: Relativism Without Relative Truth,” *Ergo* 1 (2014): 139-168.
- “Linguistic Function and Content: Reflections on Price’s Pragmatism,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 64 (2014): 497-506.
- “Sellars on the Function of Semantic Vocabulary,” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 22 (2014): 792-811.
- “Intentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson from Early Modern Philosophy?”, in M. Lenz and A. Waldow (eds.), *Nature and Norms in Thought: Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy* (Springer, 2013).
- “Validity Curry Strengthened,” *Thought* 2 (2013): 100-107.
- “Intentional Relations and the Sideways-on View: On McDowell’s Critique of Sellars,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 21 (2013): 300-319.
- “Objective Being and ‘Ofness’ in Descartes,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 84 (2012): 378-418.
- “Deflating Logical Consequence,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 61 (2011): 320-342.
- “Expressibility and the Liar’s Revenge,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 89 (2011): 297-314.
- “Two Kinds of Intentionality in Locke,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 91 (2010): 554-586.
- “Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 58 (2008): 265-277.
- “The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics,” *Philosophical Studies* 129 (2006): 477-515.
- “Bandom on the Normativity of Meaning,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68 (2004): 141-160.
- “‘The Transition from Sensibility to Reason *In Regressu*’: Indeterminism in Kant’s *Reflexionen*,” *Kant-Studien* 92 (2001): 3-12.
- “Toward ‘Perfect Collections of Properties’: Locke on the Constitution of Substantial Sorts,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 29 (1999): 551-593.

“‘Coordinative Definition’ and Reichenbach’s Semantic Framework: A Reassessment,” *Erkenntnis* 41 (1994): 287-323.

Comments and Review

“Strawson’s Quasi-Realism: Explaining Fact-Stating From the Bottom Up,” contribution to online series *Flickering Shadows: Truth in 16mm*, ed. Huw Price.

Review of Robert Brandom’s *Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 88 (2010): 367-371.

Presentations

“Instrumentalism and Deflationism,” Theoretical Philosophy Colloquium, University of Utrecht (Netherlands), June 2021

“Two Deflationary Perspectives,” CUNY-Bergen workshop on Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic, New York, September 2019

“Sellars, Truth Pluralism, and Truth Relativism,” colloquium in Theoretical Philosophy, University of Halle (Germany), June 2018.

“Truth’s Dialectical Role,” workshop *Fact and Friction*, University of Potsdam (Germany), June 2018.

“Sellars, Truth Pluralism, and Truth Relativism,” colloquium in Theoretical Philosophy, University of Potsdam (Germany), June 2017.

“Sellars, Truth Pluralism, and Truth Relativism,” colloquium at LMS Center, University of Hradec Králové (Czechia), November 2016.

“Logical Expressivism and Logical Relations,” workshop on themes from Jaroslav Peregrin’s *Inferentialism*, Prague, November 2016.

“The Very Idea of a Substructural Approach to Paradox,” *Logica 2016*, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, June 2016.

“Sellars, Truth Pluralism and Truth Relativism,” conference on Wilfrid Sellars’s Place in Twentieth-Century Philosophy, University of Erlangen (Germany), June 2015.

“Two Approaches to Deflating Truth Relativism,” conference on *The Coherence of Relativism*, University of Bonn (Germany), December 2014.

“From Global Pragmatism to Global Subjectivism,” conference on *Global Expressivism?*, University of Szczecin, Poland, August 2014.

“Assertoric Force Perspectivalism: Relativism Without Relative Truth,” Discourse in Philosophy Colloquium, Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, May 2014.

- “Why and How to Get One’s Head Around Noncontractive Responses to Paradox,” Substructural Approaches to Paradox Workshop, LOGOS, University of Barcelona, November 2013.
- “Naive Sequent Structure, Contraction and Paradox,” Truth and Paradox Workshop, Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU Munich, May 2013.
- “Relativism and Inferentialism,” workshop on *Inferentialism in the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and Action*, UNED, Madrid, October 2012.
- “Contraction-Free Logics and the Hidden Substructure of Read’s Bullet,” *Logica 2012*, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, June 2012.
- “How ‘Meaning and Truth Talk Gets its Connection with the World’: Sellars on the Function of Semantical Vocabulary,” Sellars Centenary Workshop, University College Dublin, June 2012.
- “Relativism Without Relative Truth,” Arché Research Centre, University of St Andrews (Scotland), November 2011.
- “Prospects and Problems for a Consequence Connective” (two talks), Foundations of Logical Consequence seminar, Arché Research Centre, University of St Andrews (Scotland), November 2011.
- “Relativism Without Relative Truth,” Philosophy colloquium, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, November 2011.
- “Two Kinds of Intentionality: A Lesson from Early Modern Philosophy?,” *Nature versus Normativity? – Joining Contemporary and Early Modern Perspectives on Intentionality and Knowledge*, Humboldt-Universität Berlin, July 2011.
- “Relativism Without Relative Truth,” *EPR3: Expressivism, Projection and Rules*, Sydney, June 2011
- “Sellars on Semantical Rules and the Meaning of ‘Means’,” Prague International Colloquium *Normativity of Meaning: Sellarsian Perspectives*, Prague, May 2011.
- “Adding Content to Price’s Pragmatism,” conference on Huw Price’s *Naturalism Without Mirrors*, Zurich, May 2011.
- “Sellars on Intentionality: Does the Sideways-on View Reflect a Blind Spot?,” *Engaging McDowell*, Sydney, July 2010.
- “Can Representationalist Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’ Clauses?,” Australasian Association of Philosophy annual meeting, Sydney, July 2010.
- “What Are We Thinking ‘Of’? Case Studies in Descartes and Locke,” History and Philosophy Seminar, University of New South Wales (Sydney), April 2010.
- “‘That’ Clauses and the Theory of Content,” Propositions and Same-Saying Workshop, Macquarie University (Sydney), January 2010.
- “Bifurcating Intentionality: Case Studies in Descartes and Locke,” Philosophy Program seminar, Australian National University (Canberra), September 2009.

- “Deflating Logical Consequence,” Australasian Association of Philosophy annual meeting, Melbourne, July 2009.
- “Deflating Logical Consequence,” International Symposium *Logica 2009*, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, June 2009.
- “Locke on ‘Ideas of Features and Sorts,” Philosophy Department seminar, University of Sydney, March 2009.
- “A Dogma about Naturalized Representation,” Pragmatic Foundations Project Research Workshop, Centre for Time, University of Sydney, January 2009.
- “Revenge and Expression,” American Philosophical Association Pacific Division meeting, Pasadena, March 2008.
- “Revenge and Expression,” International Symposium *Logica 2007*, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, June 2007.
- “Naive Truth-Conditions and Meaning,” International Symposium *Logica 2006*, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, June 2006.
- “Semantics Without Ascent,” *Camp Out!* A Conference in Honor of Joe Camp, University of Pittsburgh, April 2006.
- “Making Sense of Circular Concepts,” Working Group in the History and Philosophy of Logic, Mathematics, and Science, University of California, Berkeley, April 2005.
- “Making Sense of Circular Concepts,” Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, Storrs, November 2004.
- “Brandom on the Normativity of Meaning,” Prague International Colloquium *Pragmatism and Semantics*, Prague, June 2000.